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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
In United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), 
we sustained a defendant's claim that the government's 
investigatory misconduct was so egregious that the due 
process clause demanded dismissal of the indictment 
against him. This holding was predicated on a pair of 
Supreme Court cases that appeared to recognize such a 
defense, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), and 
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). In contrast 
to some other circuits which have never recognized the 
defense or no longer do so, see United States v. Tucker, 28 
F.3d 1420, 1426-27 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Boyd, 
55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995), it has remained viable in 
this circuit, though in the twenty years since Twigg we have 
not found another set of facts that satisfy its rigorous 
requirements. See United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 623 (1996). In the present 
appeal, defendant Angela Nolan-Cooper contends that the 
government's misconduct in its investigation of her was 
sufficiently egregious enough to warrant this extraordinary 
relief. 
 
Ms. Nolan-Cooper, a Philadelphia lawyer, became the 
target of an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") investigation 
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when the government received information that she was 
involved in the laundering of illicit drug proceeds. The IRS 
set up a sting operation as part of its investigation, and 
Nolan-Cooper readily accepted the opportunity to launder 
funds for an undercover government agent who was posing 
as a wealthy drug dealer from Louisiana. During the course 
of the thirteen-month investigation, however, the 
government agent insinuated himself into a close social 
relationship with Nolan-Cooper, which culminated, on one 
occasion, in sexual intercourse. It is this relationship which 
Nolan-Cooper argues crossed the bounds of permissible 
investigatory activity. 
 
Nolan-Cooper moved to dismiss the indictment. The 
district court disagreed with her characterization of the 
government's conduct as "outrageous," and denied the 
motion. Had the sexual misconduct been present 
throughout the investigation (with the actual or 
constructive knowledge of supervisory personnel), a 
different situation would be presented. However, it did not 
occur until the investigation was nearing its close. 
Moreover, after an extensive evidentiary hearing, the district 
court found that the agent's sexual exploits served no 
investigatory purpose, and that there was no evidence of 
discussions among the investigating agents and their 
superiors concerning the use of sex to induce Nolan- 
Cooper's continued participation in the illicit scheme. In 
light of these non-clearly erroneous findings, and despite 
the fact that some criminal activity took place after the 
sexual misconduct, we cannot agree that the government's 
conduct here offends due process. We will therefore affirm 
the district court's denial of Nolan-Cooper's motion to 
dismiss. 
 
Nolan-Cooper preserved for appeal the district court's 
ruling on her motion by a conditional guilty plea to thirteen 
counts of conspiracy and money laundering, for which she 
was sentenced to seventy-two (72) months in prison plus a 
fine and forfeiture of certain assets. In return for her plea, 
the government agreed that it would recommend a term of 
incarceration within the stipulated range of 41 to 51 
months. The government also agreed that it would not 
oppose Nolan-Cooper's position on the applicability of 
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certain Sentencing Guideline provisions to her guideline 
range calculation. Nolan-Cooper contends that the 
government breached the plea agreement by failing to follow 
through on these promises. We agree. Because our 
jurisprudence establishes that when a plea bargain is 
breached, resentencing must be before a different district 
judge, our mandate will require that the case be re- 
assigned to another judge of the district court for 
resentencing. 
 
Nolan-Cooper also argued at sentencing that the 
government's misconduct during the undercover 
investigation, even if it did not rise to the level of a due 
process violation, warranted a downward departure from 
the applicable sentencing range. The court rejected her 
contention and declined to grant the departure, apparently 
because the court believed that it was precluded from 
departing because the government's misconduct was 
neither related to Nolan-Cooper's guilt nor rose to the level 
of a due process violation. Since we must remand for 
resentencing because of the breached plea agreement, we 
need not rule on Nolan-Cooper's claim that the court was 
not so precluded. However, since we presume that Nolan- 
Cooper will move for a departure on the same grounds at 
her resentencing, for the guidance of the district court we 
will discuss the merits of her claim. Under the approach set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Koon v. United States, 518 
U.S. 81 (1996), we believe that the district court is not 
categorically precluded from departing based upon 
government investigatory misconduct, and therefore the 
court may consider on remand whether the facts presented 
here take this case outside of the Guidelines' "heartland" 
and thereby warrant a downward departure. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
The district court held an evidentiary hearing and made 
extensive findings of fact. Neither party has challenged 
these findings and we therefore accept the facts as the 
district court has found them. 
 
A. The Money Laundering Scheme 
 
This case arises out of an IRS investigation into the 
money laundering activity of Nolan-Cooper, who became a 
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target when that agency received information from 
confidential informants that she was assisting others to 
launder funds derived from illegal activities, including the 
sale of drugs. At some point, the IRS apparently determined 
that it would attempt to inculpate Nolan-Cooper by setting 
up a sting operation. In order to effectuate the sting, the 
IRS arranged to have Special Agent Louis Oubre pose 
undercover as "Louis Richard," a wealthy drug dealer from 
New Orleans. On February 7, 1994, a meeting between 
Nolan-Cooper and Oubre at a hotel near the Philadelphia 
International Airport was arranged by one Oswald McBride, 
an acquaintance of Nolan-Cooper's who had, unbeknownst 
to her, become a confidential government informant. Nolan- 
Cooper attended the meeting on the understanding that 
"Mr. Richard" had some business to discuss with her. 
During the meeting, Oubre informed Nolan-Cooper that he 
was a drug dealer and that he had significant drug 
proceeds that he wanted to make look legitimate. 
 
At this meeting, Nolan-Cooper told Oubre that she could 
assist him in a number of ways. Specifically, she informed 
him that she could accomplish his goals by (1) setting up 
a sham business; and (2) hiding his money in Bahamian 
bank accounts. She further assured Oubre that she was 
experienced in the art of laundering money, asserting that 
"the way I do it, I'm . . . not gonna make any mistakes," 
and claiming that she had had "plenty of clients" who were 
in similar situations. When the agent asked her, "how soon 
. . . can we start," Nolan-Cooper replied, "right away." 
 
Indeed, Nolan-Cooper began assisting Oubre right away. 
Two days after the initial meeting, on February 9, Nolan- 
Cooper and Oubre met again, at which time they discussed 
a plan to set up a sham corporation.1 On March 11, 1994, 
Oubre met Nolan-Cooper for a third time, and gave her 
$12,000 to open a sham corporate bank account. At this 
meeting Nolan-Cooper explained to Oubre how the sham 
corporation would work, so as to avoid detection by the 
government. Additional details of the money laundering 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The details of the sham corporation are not relevant to the present 
appeal. In brief, Oubre and Nolan-Cooper set up "LAR Productions, Inc.," 
a purported music production, promotion, and recording company. 
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scheme were arranged in meetings in May through 
December 1994. Importantly, on May 10, Oubre gave 
Nolan-Cooper $42,000 in cash to launder through the 
sham corporation. She informed Oubre at that time that 
she could not launder the entire amount all at once, and 
that she would need to do it gradually, in smaller 
increments. 
 
Nolan-Cooper continued to launder funds for Oubre 
through March of 1995. On December 19, 1994, for 
example, Oubre gave Nolan-Cooper $85,000 to transfer into 
a Cayman Islands bank account, explaining that he needed 
the money deposited there in order to consummate a drug 
transaction. Oubre paid Nolan-Cooper $8,490 to perform 
this transfer. All told, the total amount of laundered funds 
involved in the scheme to which Nolan-Cooper has pled 
guilty was $192,772. The district court concluded that: 
 
       The evidence is overwhelming that Ms. Nolan-Cooper's 
       criminal conduct in this case was pervasive and 
       entirely voluntary. From the first meeting with Agent 
       Oubre, Ms. Nolan-Cooper planned the scheme to 
       launder the proceeds of drug activities, recruited 
       coconspirators, counseled Agent Oubre as to how to 
       execute the scheme, and then personally undertook to 
       effectuate the objectives of the conspiracy. 
 
Attachment to Appellant's Brief ("Att.") at 46 (Memorandum 
dated Mar. 11, 1997, on Defendant's Motions for Downward 
Departure and Other Sentencing Issues, at 11). 
 
B. Agent Oubre's Romantic Overtures 
 
During the approximately thirteen-month undercover 
investigation, Agent Oubre made several trips to the 
Philadelphia area to meet with Nolan-Cooper. In order to 
maintain his cover as a wealthy drug dealer, Oubre stayed 
in expensive rooms at the city's best hotels, rented fancy 
cars, ate expensive dinners, and consumed a considerable 
amount of alcohol. Moreover, during these visits Oubre 
initiated many social get-togethers with Nolan-Cooper, 
typically involving dinner at pricey restaurants, drinks, and 
partying late into the evening at area nightclubs. They were 
paid for by Oubre (with funds supplied by the government) 
and often cost upwards of several hundred dollars per 
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night. These social events sometimes included other 
individuals (some of whom were suspected co-conspirators), 
and sometimes involved only Oubre and Nolan-Cooper, who 
apparently accepted Oubre's invitations without much 
resistance. 
 
Although not involving formal business discussions, 
Oubre used these social meetings to develop and cement a 
relationship with Nolan-Cooper. There is also testimony in 
the record (though the district court did not make reference 
to these facts in its opinion) that Oubre often bought Nolan- 
Cooper small gifts, that he addressed her with affectionate 
pet names, and that, on two occasions, he was seen being 
physically affectionate with her. In addition, Oubre was also 
introduced to other targets of the investigation and other 
suspected co-conspirators as a result of these efforts. 
 
The present appeal revolves primarily around the events 
of February 17, 1995. On that day, Oubre had arranged 
one of the social occasions just described. An evening of 
dinner and nightclubbing was planned, with the scheduled 
attendees to include Oubre, Nolan-Cooper, Special Agent 
Henry Jolly (posing as Oubre's bodyguard, "Tony Jones"), 
and Donita Nero, a friend of Nolan-Cooper's. Oubre had 
also invited Michael Taylor, another target of the 
investigation. When Taylor subsequently declined to attend, 
Daniel Rose, the group manager of the IRS investigation, 
decided that the evening's events should be canceled 
entirely. Oubre, however, suggested to Rose that such a 
sudden cancellation might anger Nolan-Cooper. Rose 
eventually decided that the agents would be allowed to 
attend the scheduled dinner, but instructed them to return 
to their hotel for debriefing immediately thereafter. Oubre 
then called Nolan-Cooper and informed her that he and 
Agent Jolly had "business" later that evening, and that they 
consequently would have to excuse themselves after dinner. 
 
Nolan-Cooper and Nero arrived at the hotel suite shared 
by agents Oubre and Jolly at approximately 8:30 p.m. After 
drinks from the suite's mini-bar, the foursome left for 
dinner at an expensive Philadelphia area restaurant. They 
returned to the suite at 11:30 p.m., at which point Nolan- 
Cooper and Nero retrieved their car and departed. 
According to Nolan-Cooper and Nero, Oubre and Jolly had 
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made plans to reunite with them at Quincy's, a 
Philadelphia nightclub, following completion of their 
"business." Oubre denied this. He testified that the two 
women had informed him where they were going to be later 
in the evening, and that he replied that he might try to call 
them if he and Agent Jolly finished their "business" early 
enough. 
 
IRS agents debriefed Oubre and Jolly until about 1:00 
a.m. According to Oubre, he and Jolly wanted to "unwind" 
after the debriefing, and so they proceeded to a nightclub 
known as Club Illusions to do so. Oubre further testified 
that he did not like the crowd there that night, and so he 
and Jolly decided to move to Quincy's instead. Whether the 
meeting was planned or by chance, Oubre and Jolly 
happened upon Nolan-Cooper and Nero at Quincy's just as 
it was about to close for the evening. Shortly thereafter, all 
four proceeded back to the agents' hotel suite -- at, 
according to Nolan-Cooper, the agents' request. 
 
What occurred once they arrived at the suite is disputed. 
According to Nolan-Cooper (whose account of the facts the 
district court essentially accepted), she, Nero and the 
agents initially sat in the living room of the suite, which 
was adjacent to the two separate bedrooms. Bottles of wine 
were ordered to be brought up to the suite. At some point 
thereafter, Oubre and Nolan-Cooper excused themselves 
from Jolly and Nero and went into one of the bedrooms, 
where they stayed for some period of time (between forty- 
five minutes and two hours, according to the testimony). 
During that time Oubre and Nolan-Cooper engaged in 
sexual intercourse. 
 
Nero testified that while Oubre and Nolan-Cooper were in 
the bedroom, she and Agent Jolly talked and kissed. 
Sometime between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., after Oubre 
and Nolan-Cooper emerged from the bedroom, the agents 
drove her and Ms. Nero back to Quincy's, where their car 
was still parked, and they departed. Nero testified that her 
phone was ringing when she eventually arrived at her 
home, and that the caller was Jolly, entreating her to 
return to the hotel suite. Nero responded by inviting Jolly 
to her home instead. 
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Jolly arrived at Nero's home later that morning, and they 
proceeded to engage in sexual intercourse. According to 
Nero, she drove Jolly back to the hotel suite at 
approximately 12:30 p.m. During this ride, Jolly was paged 
by Oubre, and cellular phone records indicate that Jolly 
returned that page by calling the hotel shortly thereafter. 
The district court found that this series of calls suggests 
that the agents attempted to develop a "cover story" which 
they would use to explain to their superiors their conduct 
from the night before. The court reached this conclusion 
partly in light of the fact that the agents failed to contact 
their supervisors at any time during the period of the 
evening that they spent with Nolan-Cooper and Nero. 
 
The district court found that the sexual activity between 
Oubre and Nolan-Cooper was not "part and parcel of a 
government scheme to use sex as a tool in the 
investigation." To the contrary, the court determined that 
the conduct of Agents Oubre and Jolly on the night in 
question appeared to be directed at "shaking loose" from 
the oversight of their supervisors, who apparently would 
have disapproved of their plans. The court found no 
evidence, at any stage of the investigation, of discussions 
concerning the use of sex as an inducement, reward or lure 
to obtain Nolan-Cooper's cooperation in the illegal activity. 
Indeed, the court found no evidence whatsoever that there 
was "any nexus or connection between the alleged sex and 
the investigation."2 
 
C. Procedural History 
 
The IRS investigation of Nolan-Cooper ended with her 
arrest on March 24, 1995, and her subsequent indictment. 
She moved to dismiss the indictment based on the alleged 
sexual misconduct by the undercover agents assigned to 
her case. After a six-day evidentiary hearing, the district 
court denied the motion. Att. at 3. Although the district 
court found that Oubre had engaged in sexual intercourse 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Nolan-Cooper also claimed that she and Agent Oubre engaged in 
sexual intercourse on two other occasions -- August 12-13, 1994, and 
December 16-17, 1994. The court did not find these allegations to be 
supported by the facts, and Nolan-Cooper has not challenged the 
findings as clearly erroneous. 
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with Nolan-Cooper, and had attempted to cover-up the 
events of the night in question, it rejected the claim that 
Oubre's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to violate 
Nolan-Cooper's due process rights and warrant a dismissal. 
Att. at 27-28. 
 
Following the district court's rejection of her motion to 
dismiss, Nolan-Cooper entered a guilty plea to thirteen 
counts of the superseding indictment, including conspiracy 
and substantive money laundering charges.3  After a 
hearing, the district court imposed a sentence of 72 months 
incarceration, plus a fine of $10,000 and forfeiture of 
$41,955.38. Alleging that the government had breached the 
plea agreement at the sentencing hearing, Nolan-Cooper 
filed a motion for resentencing, which was denied. See 
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 957 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Pa. 
1997). This appeal, of both the sentence and the order 
denying the motion to dismiss, followed. We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. The Motion to Dismiss for Outrageous Government 
Conduct 
 
Nolan-Cooper's first contention on appeal is that the 
district court erred in rejecting her motion to dismiss the 
indictment. That motion was premised on the claim that 
the government's conduct in investigating this matter was 
outrageous and constituted a violation of her due process 
rights. According to Nolan-Cooper, Agent Oubre's 
cultivation of a romantic and ultimately sexual relationship 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Nolan-Cooper pled guilty to: 
 
       1) One count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in 
       violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1956(h) and 18 U.S.C. S 1956(a)(3)(B); 
 
       2) Ten counts of money laundering and aiding and abetting, in 
       violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1956(a)(3)(B) and 18 U.S.C. S 2; 
 
       3) One count of conspiracy to structure or assist in structuring 
any 
       transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions, in 
       violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371 and 31 U.S.C.S 5324(a)(3); and 
 
       4) One count of criminal forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
       S 982(a)(1). 
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with her was part of his investigative strategy and, as such, 
was an unjustifiable intrusion into the most personal 
aspects of her life in violation of her fundamental (due 
process and privacy) rights. The district court saw it 
differently. While the court found that Agent Oubre's 
conduct was "reprehensible," see Nolan-Cooper, 957 F. 
Supp. at 664 n.30, it concluded that: 
 
       The court does not find that in the totality of the 
       circumstances a single incident by the undercover 
       agent which was not approved or planned by the 
       Government agents in charge of the investigation who 
       had exercised due diligence and control over the 
       activities of the undercover agents rises to the level of 
       outrageous governmental conduct. 
 
Att. at 27. While we reach the result by a slightly different 
route, we believe that the district court's rejection of Nolan- 
Cooper's motion to dismiss the indictment was not in error. 
Our standard of review is mixed. We exercise plenary review 
over the district court's legal conclusions, and review any 
challenges to the court's factual findings for clear error. See 
United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
A. The Outrageous Government Conduct Doctrine  
 
It is the law of this circuit that a criminal defendant may 
raise a due process challenge to an indictment against her 
based on a claim that the government employed outrageous 
law enforcement investigative techniques. See Voigt, 89 
F.3d at 1064. The notion that misconduct by the 
government in investigating crime could give rise to a due 
process violation traces its modern roots to Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), in which the Court vacated 
the conviction of a suspected drug pusher whose stomach 
had been forcibly pumped so that the police could attempt 
to obtain incriminating evidence likely found therein. 
Twenty years later, in the now-famous dictum which 
spawned the so-called "outrageous conduct" defense, the 
Court affirmed that Rochin, while rare, was not a unique 
case: 
 
       [W]e may some day be presented with a situation in 
       which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so 
       outrageous that due process principles would 
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       absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial 
       processes to obtain a conviction. 
 
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) 
(citing Rochin). 
 
The Court revisited this dictum in Hampton v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), in which the defendant, relying 
on Russell, argued for the application of a due process 
based outrageous misconduct defense. Although the Court 
rejected his claim, the legal viability of the defense was 
maintained by a narrow margin.4 Yet, shortly thereafter, 
signs appeared that that narrow margin was beginning to 
shift. In United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), the 
government employed a confederate to distract a bank 
official while agents rifled through his briefcase and found 
documents that were eventually used in the prosecution of 
some of the bank's customers. The customers could not 
challenge the search under the Fourth Amendment because 
they did not have a cognizable privacy interest in the 
briefcase, and the Court held that its supervisory power 
similarly did not authorize a federal court to suppress the 
evidence. See 447 U.S. at 735. Justice Powell, author of the 
Hampton concurrence, wrote for the Court: 
 
       But even if we assume that the unlawful briefcase 
       search was so outrageous as to offend fundamental 
       "canons of decency and fairness," . . . the fact remains 
       that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process Clause . . . 
       come into play only when the Government activity in 
       question violates some protected right of the 
       defendant." 
 
Id. at 737 n.9 (citing Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality 
opinion) (internal citations omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Only eight justices participated in the consideration and decision of 
Hampton. A three-justice plurality and a two-justice concurrence voted to 
deny Hampton relief. Although the plurality favored a per se rule that, in 
cases of police overinvolvement in the suspect's criminal activity, there 
can be no due process violation when the defendant's predisposition to 
commit the crime can be shown, the concurring justices joined with a 
two-justice dissent to validate the outrageous conduct defense. See 
Hampton, 495 U.S. at 491-95 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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While one could read the Payner dictum narrowly to say 
merely that a defendant may raise the outrageousness 
defense only when it is his or her rights that have been 
violated (and not, for example, the privacy rights of others), 
some have read Justice Powell's adoption of the Hampton 
plurality's language in Payner as a sign that a majority of 
the Court no longer believed in the viability of the defense. 
See United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1272 (7th Cir. 
1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).5 While Judge 
Easterbrook's viewpoint may ultimately prevail, and while it 
appears that the viability of the doctrine is hanging by a 
thread, see, e.g., Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1426-27, and Boyd, 55 
F.3d at 241, we have, since Payner, concluded that "we 
have no reason to doubt that the Court continues to 
recognize a due process claim premised upon outrageous 
law enforcement investigative techniques." Voigt, 89 F.3d at 
1064. Many of the other circuits have done the same. See 
United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(collecting cases recognizing the viability of the defense 
from the D.C., First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits). 
 
While continuing to recognize, in theory, the 
outrageousness defense, we have nonetheless observed 
that, because of the extraordinary nature of the doctrine, 
the judiciary has been "extremely hesitant" to uphold 
claims that law enforcement conduct violates the Due 
Process clause. See Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1065; United States v. 
Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir. 1982) (in banc). The 
First Circuit similarly has declared the outrageous 
government misconduct doctrine "moribund" in light of the 
fact that, in practice, "courts have rejected its application 
with almost monotonous regularity." United States v. 
Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The banner of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This conclusion is based on the fact that Justice Powell, who 
ostensibly cast the necessary vote to uphold the outrageousness defense 
in Hampton (in spite of the wishes of the plurality), made explicit 
reference to that plurality's reasoning in his opinion rejecting the due 
process claim in Payner. According to Judge Easterbrook, this adoption 
of the Hampton plurality's language signals that Payner was adopting the 
"core" of the Hampton plurality's assessment of the issue. See Miller, 891 
F.2d at 1272. 
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outrageous misconduct is often raised but seldom 
saluted."). Indeed, since Hampton, the only opinion 
upholding the application of the defense is the opinion for 
a divided panel of this court in United States v. Twigg, 588 
F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).6 Twigg, however, involved a quite 
egregious case of government overinvolvement in which the 
government's undercover operative essentially concocted 
and conducted the entire illicit scheme. Although Twigg 
rightly suggested that "no justifying social objective" is 
served when law enforcement creates new crimes for the 
sake of bringing charges against a suspect that the 
government itself has persuaded into participating in 
wrongdoing, see id. at 379 (citing United States v. West, 
511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975)), it distinguished its 
facts from the situation where an undercover agent 
becomes involved in the operation after the criminal 
scheme has been created. See Twigg, 588 F.2d at 380. 
Thus, Twigg itself is of little help to Nolan-Cooper.7 
 
While we reaffirmed the cognizability of a due process 
claim premised on outrageous government conduct in Voigt, 
supra, that case does not shed much light on how we 
should analyze such claims because it deals specifically 
with deliberate intrusions by the government into the 
attorney-client relationship. See Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1067. 
Voigt observes that the showing required to make out an 
outrageous conduct claim, "is by no means pellucid." Voigt, 
89 F.3d at 1064. And, other courts have experienced 
considerable difficulty in translating "outrageous 
misconduct" into a defined set of behavioral norms. See 
Santana, 6 F.3d at 3-4. One parsing of the Russell dictum 
which spawned the defense suggests that that some variant 
of the fundamental fairness standard should be applied as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Eighth Circuit has also suggested that the doctrine could apply 
when "[t]he government agents' overzealous efforts to instigate crime also 
involved rather extreme and questionable measures--including the 
smoking of marijuana--to gain [the defendant's] confidence and lure him 
into committing a crime he was not otherwise ready and willing to 
commit." United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1297 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 
7. Indeed, three judges of the in banc court in Jannotti, supra, expressed 
the view that Twigg should be overruled. See 673 F.2d at 610 n.17. 
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the "sounding line" for outrageousness. Id. at 4. And a 
survey of the case law reports that: 
 
       Although the requirement of outrageousness has been 
       stated in several different ways by various courts, the 
       thrust of each of these formulations is that the 
       challenged conduct must be shocking, outrageous, and 
       clearly intolerable. . . . The cases make it clear that 
       this is an extraordinary defense reserved for only the 
       most egregious circumstances. It is not to be invoked 
       each time the government acts deceptively or 
       participates in a crime that it is investigating. Nor is it 
       intended merely as a device to circumvent the 
       predisposition test in the entrapment defense. 
 
Mosley, 965 F.2d at 910. Though lacking in"mathematical 
precision," the "shocking, outrageous, and clearly 
intolerable" standard provides sufficient guidance to courts 
attempting to assess whether particular government 
conduct is fundamentally unfair and thereby offends due 
process. See Santana, 6 F.3d at 4. It also underscores how 
rare application of the Due Process clause is in these 
circumstances. 
 
B. Due Process Challenges Premised on Sexual 
Misconduct 
 
Other courts have considered due process challenges 
specifically premised on alleged sexual misconduct by 
government operatives in the course of their investigations. 
Two such cases are particularly instructive on the thorny 
issue of how we should evaluate the use of sexual or 
emotional intimacy in undercover operations. Thefirst is 
United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987), in 
which the FBI employed a known prostitute and heroin 
user as an informant in an undercover investigation of a 
suspected heroin dealer. After befriending the defendant, 
the informant, acting on her own initiative, became sexually 
intimate with him. The informant subsequently introduced 
the defendant to other undercover agents posing as 
potential heroin purchasers, and he was ultimately arrested 
after an arranged deal with one of the agents was 
consummated. See id. at 1464. Although the FBI did not 
encourage the informant to use sex in carrying out her 
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assignment, at some point the agency became aware of her 
sexual involvement with the defendant and decided not to 
terminate her participation in the investigation. See id. at 
1467-68. 
 
The defendant argued that the informant's use of sex as 
a means of gaining his trust through intimacy, and the 
government's continued employment of the informant after 
learning of her sexual involvement with the defendant, 
constituted outrageous misconduct and an invasion of his 
privacy and autonomy rights. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, 
reasoning that: 
 
       the deceptive creation and/or exploitation of an 
       intimate relationship does not exceed the boundary of 
       permissible law enforcement tactics. . . . The betrayed 
       suspect might feel foolish or insulted but a suspect 
       cannot complain of government impropriety based on 
       the use of deception alone. And, Simpson does not 
       claim that he was physically or psychologically coerced 
       into developing a close relationship with [the 
       informant]. . . . The due process clause does not 
       protect Simpson from voluntarily reposing his trust in 
       one who turns out to be unworthy of it. 
 
Id. at 1466; see also Miller, 891 F.2d at 1268 (rejecting 
outrageousness claim when government used informant 
who previously had had a sexual relationship with 
defendant). Importantly, however, the Simpson court stated 
that it "need not decide at this time whether the use of sex 
as a law enforcement tool would `shock the conscience' 
under circumstances where the government is clearly 
responsible, as would be the case if [the informant] had 
been a law enforcement officer rather than a paid 
informant." Id. at 1468 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 
Despite this distinction, the Simpson court made a 
number of general observations about the difficulties in 
finding the government's use or condonation of sex by 
undercover operatives sufficiently outrageous so as to rise 
to the level of a due process violation. The court observed: 
 
       To win a suspect's confidence, an informant must 
       make overtures of friendship and trust and must enjoy 
       a great deal of freedom in deciding how best to 
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       establish a rapport with the suspect. In a particular 
       case the informant might perceive a need to establish 
       a physical as well as emotional bond with the suspect. 
       We see no principled way to identify a fixed point along 
       the continuum from causal physical contact to intense 
       physical bonding beyond which the relationship 
       becomes "shocking" when entertained by an informant. 
       Rather, any attempt to distinguish between holding 
       hands, hugging, kissing, engaging in sexual foreplay, 
       and having sexual intercourse on a regular basis in 
       order to decide when an informant has "gone too far" 
       would require us to draw upon our peculiarly personal 
       notions of human sexuality and social mores. The 
       Supreme Court has rightly indicated that the 
       outrageous conduct doctrine ought not to be applied in 
       so subjective a manner. . . . 
 
       [W]e refuse to draw fine lines based on the level of 
       emotional intimacy inhering in a particular informant- 
       suspect relationship. . . . Exploiting an emotionally 
       intimate relationship between lovers seems no more 
       egregious than exploiting an emotionally intimate 
       relationship between family members. Second, courts 
       are not well equipped to assess the degree of intimacy 
       perceived by particular suspects . . . such that 
       individual judicial determinations that sexual 
       relationships were sufficiently intimate to bar 
       prosecution would lack the "universality" of 
       condemnation required by the due process clause. 
 
Id. at 1466-67. 
 
While Simpson dealt only with the government's use of 
civilian informants (in contrast to undercover government 
agents), we believe that many of the same considerations 
that troubled the Ninth Circuit also arise here. We agree 
that trying to fit a subjective notion such as intimacy into 
the framework of the Due Process clause is an immensely 
difficult task. Yet, our view of this problem may differ from 
Simpson in at least one significant respect. Although we 
agree that undercover agents cannot be deprived of the 
ability to develop strong bonds with their targets in order 
for investigations to proceed, and that it is exceedingly 
difficult to identify the point at which physical contact and 
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emotional intimacy between an undercover agent and his or 
her target suspect becomes outrageous as a matter of 
constitutional law, we believe that such a point does exist. 
Therefore we must endeavor to determine whether it has 
been reached on the facts of this case. 
 
The only federal appellate decision that deals specifically 
with a sexual relationship between a suspect and an 
undercover government agent is United States v. Cuervelo, 
949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991). In that case, the defendant 
was the subject of a government operation designed to 
ferret out a drug conspiracy. The undercover DEA agent 
conducting the investigation testified that he tried to 
establish a "love interest" between himself and the 
defendant, and, according to the defendant, they had 
sexual relations on at least fifteen occasions. 949 F.2d at 
561, 563. In addition, the agent allegedly gave the 
defendant gifts of money, clothes, and jewelry, and wrote 
her a number of love letters. Id. at 563. The defendant 
moved to dismiss the indictment, which the district court 
denied without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Second 
Circuit remanded, holding that a hearing was required. Id. 
at 569. 
 
Based on its review of such cases as Simpson, the court 
stated that in order to make out a successful 
outrageousness claim in these circumstances, at a 
minimum, the defendant must show the following: 
 
       (1) That the government consciously set out to use 
       sex as a weapon in its investigatory arsenal, or 
       acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes 
       upon learning that such a relationship existed; 
 
       (2) That the government agent initiated a sexual 
       relationship, or allowed it to continue to exist, to 
       achieve governmental ends; and 
 
       (3) That the sexual relationship took place during or 
       close to the period covered by the indictment and 
       was entwined with the events charged therein. 
 
949 F.2d at 567. It is important to note that Cuervelo only 
held that an evidentiary hearing is warranted if the 
defendant raises allegations meeting these criteria. See id. 
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Yet, there is little doubt that Cuervelo envisioned these 
criteria as the standard to be applied on the merits since 
the court noted that, at the merits stage, the district court 
would have to consider the following questions (which 
essentially address the same issues): 
 
       (a) To what extent is the undercover agent's conduct 
       attributable to the government (i.e. did the 
       government actively or passively acknowledge or 
       encourage the sexual relationship)? 
 
       (b) What purpose(s) did the agent's sexual conduct 
       serve, if any? 
 
       (c) Did the agent act on his own initiative or under the 
       direction (or with the approval) of his agency? 
 
       (d) Who initiated the relationship? 
 
       (e) When did the alleged sexual relations end? 
 
Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 568. 
 
We believe that Cuervelo's minimum criteria standard 
effectively captures the core issues underlying an 
outrageous government conduct claim premised on sexual 
misconduct. Accordingly, we will adopt the 
Cuervelo standard as the law of this circuit, with one 
modification. Cuervelo appears to require the defendant to 
introduce evidence demonstrating that the government 
knew that its undercover agent had engaged or was 
engaging in a sexual relationship with him or her. We 
believe that this requirement may be too stringent, and 
could encourage supervisory agents to turn a blind eye to 
the conduct of their operatives. Hence, we believe that the 
defendant need only show that the government consciously 
set out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory arsenal, 
or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes once it 
knew or should have known that such a relationship 
existed. In addition, we emphasize that the Cuervelo 
criteria, while useful, should not be applied rigidly; the 
ultimate determination to be made on the merits is whether 
the government's conduct was so "shocking, outrageous, 
and clearly intolerable" that Due Process is offended. In 
most cases involving sexual misconduct by government 
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agents, however, our version of the Cuervelo factors should 
provide an appropriate framework for this analysis. 
 
C. Application 
 
We begin with the final Cuervelo factor, the timing of the 
alleged misconduct with respect to the period covered by 
the indictment. To the extent that the sexual relationship 
between Nolan-Cooper and Agent Oubre arose out of their 
ostensible money laundering business relationship, it 
cannot be disputed that the two were intertwined. Although 
Nolan-Cooper pled guilty to only one count of the 
superseding indictment (Count 18) that was premised on 
conduct which occurred after February 18, 1995, the 
overarching conspiracy count on which she was convicted 
(Count 3) alleges that the conspiracy existed until March 
24, 1995 and encompasses seven alleged overt acts which 
occurred after February 18. 
 
At the same time, we find it significant that the only 
incident of sexual intercourse found by the district court 
occurred within a month before the investigation was 
completed, and apparently well after Oubre had gathered 
the necessary evidence against Nolan-Cooper. This would 
suggest that while the sexual relationship arose out of the 
context of the investigation, it was not necessarily 
intertwined with Nolan-Cooper's offense conduct. Nolan- 
Cooper rejoins that we should not limit our focus to the one 
incident of sexual intercourse; instead, she argues that we 
should assess the pervasive pattern of "romancing" which 
she alleges Oubre undertook from virtually the outset of the 
undercover investigation. Since we have substantial doubts, 
see discussion infra, whether the alleged romancing 
significantly impacts our analysis, it appears that the 
timing of the sexual misconduct favors the government's 
position. Although the conduct underlying Count 18 and 
comprising some of the overt acts alleged in Count 5 
occurred after the sexual misconduct, in the larger factual 
context of this case we do not believe this alters the balance 
or the timing question, especially since Nolan-Cooper does 
not seriously argue about the role of the post February 18, 
1995 criminal conduct. 
 
The remaining Cuervelo factors all relate to whether the 
government and/or the undercover agent used or 
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acquiesced in the use of the sexual relationship to serve an 
investigatory or other governmental end. We must inquire 
whether the government intentionally set out to use sex as 
an investigatory tool, or acquiesced in its use once it knew 
or should have known of the relationship. We also must 
determine whether the agent initiated a sexual relationship 
or allowed such a relationship to exist to further 
governmental ends. See Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 567. As part 
of this inquiry we also assess whether the agent or the 
defendant initiated the sexual relationship. While it is 
ultimately a question of law for us to decide whether the 
agent's misconduct gives rise to a due process violation, it 
should be apparent that this stage of the inquiry also 
involves significant questions of fact. As noted previously, 
we review such findings for clear error. 
 
The district court found that the sexual intercourse that 
occurred on February 18, 1995, was not designed to further 
any investigatory end. Furthermore, the district court found 
no evidence of any discussions among the investigating 
agents and their superiors concerning the use of sex as an 
inducement, reward or lure to obtain Nolan-Cooper's 
participation in the conspiracy. In sum, the district court 
found that there was no evidence of any "nexus or 
connection" between the alleged sex and the investigation. 
While Nolan-Cooper makes a veiled attack on these 
conclusions in her brief -- contending that the district 
court "completely ignored" that Agent Oubre's relationship 
with Nolan-Cooper was an integral part of the total picture 
-- under the applicable clear error standard of review such 
a challenge falls short. It is true, as Nolan-Cooper asserts, 
that Agent Oubre initiated the dinners, nightclubbing, and 
other socializing that occurred during the course of the 
investigation. However, the district court expressly found 
that Nolan-Cooper presented insufficient evidence "that the 
Government agents initiated or allowed a sexual 
relationship to blossom." Att. at 25. 
 
Accepting, as we must, the district court's finding that 
the sexual intercourse between Agent Oubre and Nolan- 
Cooper was not designed to serve any investigatory ends, 
we conclude that this one instance of sexual misconduct 
alone does not give rise to a due process violation within 
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the extremely narrow confines of the outrageous 
government conduct doctrine. We simply do not believe that 
a one-time sexual encounter that served no investigatory 
purpose occurring near the end of an investigation can 
satisfy the difficult burden described supra . Even if it were 
to be concluded that Oubre's supervisors should have 
known that a sexual relationship existed after February 18, 
1995, the record reflects that by that point the case against 
Nolan-Cooper had already been made and there is no 
proffer that any acquiescence at that point would have 
served any investigatory purposes. The Cuervelo framework 
contemplates conduct that is designed to achieve 
investigatory or other governmental ends; failing this, that 
case cannot support Nolan-Cooper's claim.8  
 
This conclusion leaves us with Nolan-Cooper's contention 
that Agent Oubre's development of a "romantic" 
relationship in the months preceding the one incident of 
sexual intercourse changes the calculus. While this activity 
(by which we mean the dinners, nightclubbing, partying, 
etc.) does appear to be directed at establishing and 
maintaining a close relationship between agent and 
suspect, we are not persuaded that this particular conduct 
-- either alone or in tandem with the one instance of 
intercourse -- is egregious enough to make out a due 
process violation. As Simpson suggests, the mere fact that 
an undercover operative establishes a level of intimacy with 
his or her target does not alone necessarily give rise to a 
constitutional claim. 
 
Like the defendant in Simpson, Nolan-Cooper was 
apparently quite willing to develop a close bond with Agent 
Oubre.9 The mere fact that Oubre acted upon this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Moreover, this case is distinguishable in at least one important 
respect 
from Twigg. The government here did not create the money laundering 
scheme; by all accounts (including her own), Nolan-Cooper had been 
engaged in money laundering activities well before Agent Oubre 
requested her services. Thus, this is not a case where law enforcement 
created new crimes solely for the sake of bringing charges against a 
suspect who was lawfully minding her own affairs. See Twigg, 588 F.2d 
at 379-81. 
 
9. We have been presented with no evidence demonstrating any physical 
or unusual psychological coercion applied by Agent Oubre. While this is 
not a necessary element of a successful outrageous government conduct 
claim, such evidence would certainly be strongly suggestive of 
outrageousness. See generally Mosley, 965 F.2d at 911-12. 
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willingness cannot in itself be outrageous conduct, as the 
"due process clause does not protect [a defendant] from 
voluntarily reposing [her] trust in one who turns out to be 
unworthy of it." Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466. Moreover, we 
observe that much of the "romantic" conduct alleged here, 
on its face, is not that different from conduct by undercover 
operatives which we regularly find acceptable in cases 
where there is no apparent romantic undercurrent. It is not 
at all uncommon to find a heterosexual male undercover 
agent providing lavish entertainment to a heterosexual male 
suspect as a means of establishing rapport. Cf. Simpson, 
813 F.2d at 1466 (noting that informants must "enjoy a 
great deal of freedom" in deciding how to establish rapport 
with suspects). We cannot agree that the emotional 
intimacy that may inure in the bond that an undercover 
agent develops with a suspect, without more, can satisfy 
the narrow confines of the outrageous government conduct 
doctrine. 
 
In sum, that "something more" is not present on the facts 
as found by the district court. Since Nolan-Cooper cannot 
satisfy our version of the Cuervelo analysis, we will affirm 
the order of the district court denying Nolan-Cooper's 
motion to dismiss the indictment.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The government asserts that Hampton and Payner also require 
Nolan-Cooper to demonstrate that the government interfered with a 
specific constitutionally protected interest in order to make out her due 
process claim. In addition, the government contends that, under Voigt, 
an outrageous government conduct claim can only be successful if the 
defendant can show that she has been prejudiced by the government's 
acts. It is the government's position that Nolan-Cooper has failed to 
make either showing here. Since we affirm the district court's order on 
other grounds, we need not reach these issues. 
 
We also note that Nolan-Cooper's main brief makes reference to a 
"privacy" interest: 
 
       The court gave no weight in its opinion to the government's gross 
       and unprecedented violation of Nolan-Cooper's rights to privacy. 
 
However, it goes on to explain the claim as sounding in due process 
terms. 
 
        Consideration of the totality of the government's misconduct 
       shows that it constituted a serious invasion into Nolan-Cooper's 
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III. Breach of the Plea Agreement 
 
Nolan-Cooper contends that the government breached 
several provisions of the plea bargain to which she agreed 
following the district court's denial of her motion to 
dismiss. In her submission, the government failed to 
uphold its end of the deal when it recommended to the 
district court a sentence greater than it had promised to 
recommend, and when it took adverse positions on 
Sentencing Guideline adjustment provisions when it had 
agreed not to do so. Pursuant to the approach laid out in 
United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 
1989), our analysis will proceed in three steps. First, we 
will identify the terms of the agreement and the alleged 
improper conduct of the government. Second, we will 
determine whether the government violated its obligations 
under the plea agreement. Third, we will fashion an 
appropriate remedy for any violations that occurred. Nolan- 
Cooper has pointed to, and we will address, three separate 
breaches. 
 
Before we assess the present claims, however, we will set 
forth the applicable legal precepts, which are well- 
established. The basic statement of the law comes from 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971): 
 
       This phase of the process of criminal justice, and the 
       adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of 
       guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the 
       defendant what is reasonably due in the 
       circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a 
       constant factor is that when a plea rests in any 
       significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
       prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       fundamental constitutional rights of privacy, and therefore, a due 
       process violation. 
 
In her reply brief, in contrast to the main brief, the "Privacy" argument 
has a heading: "The government's conduct violated Nolan-Cooper's right 
to privacy." However, the discussion that follows lies within the same 
framework as the main brief -- the outrageous conduct issue which is 
cast in due process terms. Since we have disposed of that issue at some 
length supra, we need not address it further. 
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       inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
       fulfilled. 
 
Because the defendant, by entering into the plea, 
surrenders a number of her constitutional rights, "courts 
are compelled to scrutinize closely the promise made by the 
government in order to determine whether it has been 
performed." United States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 233 (3d 
Cir. 1991). Moreover, "the doctrine that the government 
must adhere to its bargain in the plea agreement is so 
fundamental that even though the government's breach is 
inadvertent and the breach probably did not influence the 
judge in the sentence imposed, due process and equity 
require that the sentence be vacated." Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 
Plea agreements, although arising in a criminal context, 
are analyzed under contract law standards. See 
Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1361. In determining whether the 
plea agreement has been breached, courts must determine 
"whether the government's conduct is inconsistent with 
what was reasonably understood by the defendant when 
entering the plea of guilty." United States v. Badaracco, 954 
F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Nelson, 
837 F.2d 1519, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, we 
will not permit the government to rely upon a "rigidly 
literal" approach to the construction of the terms of the 
plea agreement. See Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1361. For 
example, we have recently held that even when the 
government is given wide discretion whether to file a 
U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 (substantial assistance) motion pursuant 
to a plea agreement, the district court is empowered to 
examine for "good faith" the government's refusal to file 
such a motion. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 
483-84 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
A. The Government's Position on Guideline Adjustments 
 
       1. Use of a Special Skill [The Attorney's Escrow 
       Account Issue]. 
 
The government stipulated in the plea agreement that it 
would "not oppose" Nolan-Cooper's position at sentencing 
that certain guideline adjustments should not apply. 
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Included in this list was the "use of a special skill" 
enhancement contained in U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3 (1996), which 
calls for a two-point offense level increase if the defendant 
"used a special skill, in a manner that significantly 
facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense." 
S 3B1.3. Although the written plea agreement did not 
specifically mention this guideline provision, the 
government conceded in its sentencing memorandum that 
the special skill provision would be covered by the terms of 
the written agreement. At the sentencing hearing, however, 
the following colloquy occurred: 
 
       The Government: [I]n accordance with the plea 
       agreement, the Government is not going to comment 
       on the applicability of either the abuse of special skill 
       or with respect to the obstruction in this case. 
       However, I will comment briefly as to the facts in 
       accordance with the plea agreement and with respect 
       to the abuse of special skill I would point out to the 
       Court that on several occasions the defendant in this 
       case specifically mentioned her escrow account as a 
       resource and as a way that she could specially help 
       hide the defendant or the agent's money. . . . 
 
       The Court: [L]et me ask you something before you go 
       any further here. What is your agreement with the 
       defendant? It may be better that you just let this go 
       rather than to skirt around the edges to what you can 
       do and not do. If you're going to simply point 
       something that it already on the record, we don't really 
       need that. 
 
       The Government: Pardon, your honor. 
 
       The Court: As to -- as to those and I'm not going to 
       consider your comments on those two issues. 
 
App. at 405-06. Nolan-Cooper contends that the 
government's statement here violates the plea agreement. 
 
The government responds that these comments do not 
breach the special skill provision of the plea agreement 
because the agreement also contains a clause reserving to 
the government the right "to comment on the evidence and 
circumstances of the case and bring to the Court's 
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attention all facts relevant to sentencing." App. at 262. The 
government submits that its comments were made 
pursuant to and within the scope of this clause. Nolan- 
Cooper rejoins that the government's position is untenable 
under Badaracco, supra. We agree. 
 
In Badaracco, the government stipulated that the 
defendant's conduct "did not involve more than minimal 
planning" and thus would not warrant an enhancement 
under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(2). That section provides for a 
two-level enhancement when "significant affirmative steps 
were taken to conceal the offense." U.S.S.G. SS 1B1.1 app. 
note 1(f); 2F1.1(b)(2). At the sentencing hearing, the 
government stated that Badaracco had taken "an 
affirmative step . . . indicating that he was concealing 
something." Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 939. We found that 
this comment provided the district court with a basis upon 
which to ignore or reject the parties' stipulation and apply 
the enhancement. See id. at 940. Accordingly, we held that 
the government had "violated the spirit, if not the letter of 
the plea agreement." Id. Despite the government's 
contention that it was merely exercising its reserved right 
under the plea agreement to inform the court of the"nature 
and extent" of Badaracco's activities, we held that there had 
been a breach. Id. 
 
The present case falls squarely under Badaracco. The 
government's statement about Nolan-Cooper's use of the 
escrow account plainly could have given the court a basis 
upon which to reject the defendant's argument that the 
special skill adjustment should not apply. Indeed, the 
statement that Nolan-Cooper's escrow account was "a way 
that she could specially help hide . . . the agent's money," 
arguably tracks the guideline requirement that a special 
skill must "significantly facilitate[ ] the commission or 
concealment of the offense. . . ." See S 3B1.3. Furthermore, 
the government's proffered justification -- that it was only 
commenting on the facts pursuant to the reserved right-to- 
comment clause -- is almost identical to the justification 
that we rejected in Badaracco. 
 
Moreover, we have held previously that a promise to take 
no position on an issue (which, to a defendant, is the 
functional equivalent of a promise not to oppose) is a 
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promise not to attempt to influence the defendant's 
sentence on that particular issue. See Moscahlaidis, 868 
F.2d at 1362; see also United States v. Brye, ___ F.3d ___, 
1998 WL 318563 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding breach of plea 
agreement based on statements by government which 
implicitly argued against downward departure when 
government had promised to take no position). The 
government cannot, consistent with Moscahlaidis, rely on a 
general provision of the plea agreement permitting it to 
comment on the facts of the case to defeat the purpose of 
a specific provision requiring it not to oppose the 
defendant's position on the applicability of a particular 
adjustment. 
 
The government also argues that its comments were 
necessary because they were made in response to "a 
number of averments and factual representations" by 
defense counsel with regard to Nolan-Cooper's non-use of a 
special skill. While the plea agreement permits the 
government to "rebut any statement made by or on behalf 
of the defendant at sentencing," the government's 
concession not to oppose Nolan-Cooper's position on the 
applicability of the special skill enhancement would be 
meaningless if we permitted the government to respond to 
the facts as presented by the defendant on this issue with 
remarks that clearly "meant to serve as a possible basis for 
the district court to ignore the stipulation in the plea 
agreement." Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941. As the Tenth 
Circuit recently noted in Brye: 
 
       [T]he government breaches an agreement "not to 
       oppose" a motion when it makes statements that do 
       more than merely state facts or simply validate facts 
       found in the Presentence Report and provide a legal 
       characterization of those facts or argue the effect of 
       those facts to the sentencing judge. 
 
Brye, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 318563 at *3 (citing United 
States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 693 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
This may mean that the government must exercise the 
option of silence even if it disagrees with the defendant's 
characterization of the facts.11 "As is the case with any 
contract, the government is not free to breach its agreement 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. This is especially so when those facts are either in the factual 
record 
or are discussed in the presentence report prepared by the probation 
office, and are thereby known to the court. 
 
                                28 
  
with a defendant because it decides after the fact that it 
has made a bad bargain." Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941. On 
this basis we find that the government breached the special 
skill clause of the plea agreement. 
 
       2. Acceptance of Responsibility. 
 
For essentially the same reasons, we also agree with 
Nolan-Cooper that the government breached its promise not 
to oppose her request for a three-level downward 
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. 
S 3E1.1(b). The government stated at the sentencing 
hearing: 
 
       Your Honor, with respect to the acceptance of 
       responsibility I feel compelled to comment to the Court 
       that with reference to the proffers that defendant gave, 
       the several proffers, the Government does not believe 
       that the defendant gave complete information. And that 
       has been made known to the defense on more than one 
       occasion. . . . There are no other facts to support a 
       third point that I am aware of, your Honor. . . . I would 
       not have commented on this other than the fact that 
       the defense, both in their sentencing memorandum as 
       well as today, commented on the fact that the 
       defendant provided complete information and with 
       referencing [sic] the proffers. 
 
App. at 404-05. As above, we find that the government's 
comments provided the court with a basis upon which to 
reject Nolan-Cooper's claim that she should receive the full 
acceptance of responsibility adjustment. This violates 
Badaracco. 
 
The government suggests that this analysis should be 
altered because, at at least one point during the relevant 
portion of the sentencing hearing, the government's 
comments were made in response to a question by the 
court. We disagree. While such questions may place the 
government in an uncomfortable situation, it still must 
inform the court that it cannot answer the question without 
breaching its plea agreement. Sometimes "the better part of 
valor is discretion." William Shakespeare, King Henry the 
Fourth, Part I, act V, scene iv, line 12. 
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B. Guideline Range Stipulation 
 
Nolan-Cooper additionally contends that the government 
breached the plea agreement by recommending to the court 
a sentence outside the stipulated Guideline range. In the 
plea agreement, the government expressly represented that 
it would "make whatever sentencing recommendation it 
deems appropriate within the stipulated Sentencing 
Guideline range of 41 to 51 months imprisonment." App. at 
262. The district court, however, determined at the 
sentencing hearing that the applicable guideline range was 
actually 63 to 78 months, and denied Nolan-Cooper's 
motion for a downward departure from this range. App. 
418-51. After this finding was explained to the parties, 
additional witnesses were called, and the government was 
subsequently given the opportunity to present its 
arguments on Nolan-Cooper's sentencing to the court. The 
government made the following statement: 
 
       [These were] crimes committed by an individual who 
       knew better, who was not forced either by economics or 
       otherwise, any form of duress, to commit these crimes, 
       she chose to commit these crimes knowingly and 
       deliberately. 
 
       [I]t is difficult even now as I stand before this Court for 
       anyone, I believe, not to be shocked by the defendant's 
       callous and calculating attempts to subvert the law. 
       That would be the case whether or not she was a 
       lawyer, but the fact that she is a lawyer, someone who 
       swore to uphold the law, makes this case -- the 
       actions of this defendant particular [sic] egregious, that 
       she in fact flaunted the fact that she had special tools, 
       the escrow account, which she could use as a resource 
       to break the law. 
 
App. at 477-78. At the conclusion of its comments, the 
government stated that "the Judge should sentence the 
defendant to the higher end of the guidelines based on her 
conduct." App. at 479 (emphasis added). 
 
Defendant's counsel immediately objected, claiming that 
the government had breached the plea agreement. The 
following colloquy ensued: 
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       The Government: Your honor, I stand corrected on 
       that. When I said the higher end of the guideline range, 
       I meant within the plea agreement and I misspoke on 
       that, so that will stand corrected. 
 
       The Court: Well, it can (sic) be within the plea 
       agreement, can't it? Doesn't it have to be at least 63 
       months? 
 
       The Government: Yes, your Honor, but I think for 
       purposes of argument today, I think I can stand before 
       the Court and argue the higher end of the guideline as 
       stipulated to. 
 
       The Court: Okay, I will disregard the Government's 
       recommendation since, frankly, it seems to be a little 
       schizophrenic here as to who is recommending what to 
       whom when. So, we will give no weight to the 
       Government's recommendation in this case and I will 
       take into account [defense counsel] Mr. Howard's 
       recommendation to that. 
 
App. at 479-80. Nolan-Cooper contends that the 
government violated the plea agreement in two ways. First, 
she contends that the government's lengthy statement 
preceding its sentence recommendation -- in which the 
government characterized her in a highly negative way and 
implicitly advocated a severe sentence -- itself constitutes 
a breach. Second, Nolan-Cooper asserts that, despite the 
subsequent correction, the government's original 
recommendation of a sentence at "the higher end of the 
guidelines" was also a breach. We take up these arguments 
in turn. 
 
As we said in Badaracco, we must examine what the 
defendant reasonably understood she would be receiving 
from the government in return for her plea of guilty. See 
Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 939. We believe, as a basic matter, 
that it was entirely reasonable for Nolan-Cooper to 
understand that the government's promise to recommend a 
sentence between 41 and 51 months included a promise 
not to advocate the imposition of a sentence longer than 51 
months. See United States v. Taylor, 77 F.3d 368, 370 
(11th Cir. 1996). Advocacy "of a position requiring a greater 
sentence is flatly inconsistent with recommendation of a 
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lesser sentence." Id. To resolve Nolan-Cooper's claim that 
the government's comments preceding its recommendation 
violated the plea agreement, we must determine whether 
those comments constitute impermissible "advocacy." 
 
The First Circuit faced an almost identical situation in 
United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1992). In 
that case, the government agreed to recommend a sentence 
36 months in duration. At the sentencing hearing, however, 
the district court determined that the applicable guideline 
range was 46 to 57 months. After this determination was 
made, the government stated, inter alia: 
 
       [T]he plea agreement . . . indicates that the government 
       would recommend a period of incarceration of 36 
       months, which under the calculations, that at that 
       time under the information that was known to the 
       government . . . was the upper end of the guideline 
       range. That is in the plea agreement. 
 
       The government feels a substantial period of 
       incarceration in this case [sic], for the reason the Court 
       has already indicated: this is a massive fraud 
       perpetrated on a large number of individuals over a 
       long period of time. . . . 
 
       It is important, the government feels, that a very strong 
       message be sent by the Court. This is one of the 
       largest, if not the largest advance fee scheme, which 
       the Office of the United States Attorney has been 
       involved in in the last several years. 
 
960 F.2d at 269. After making a few more comments 
regarding restitution, the government remarked "I begged 
the question as to the specific amount of the period of 
incarceration here--" at which point the district court 
interjected "I think you are stuck with the plea agreement." 
Id. The government replied, "I believe I am, your Honor." Id. 
 
The First Circuit noted that, while the government 
informed the district court of the agreed-upon 36 month 
sentence, it never affirmatively recommended such a 
sentence and that its comments "seemed to undercut such 
a recommendation." Id. at 268. The court concluded that 
the government's comments, though not explicitly 
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repudiating the plea agreement, violated Santobello. Id. at 
269. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the 
government's "overall conduct must be reasonably 
consistent with making such a recommendation, rather 
than the reverse." Id. We agree. 
 
We considered a similar situation in Hayes, supra. In 
that case, the government agreed to "make no 
recommendation as to the specific sentence that the Court 
should impose," yet in its sentencing memorandum 
advocated "a sentence within the standard range of the 
guidelines as to Count One . . . and a lengthy period of 
incarceration on the nonguideline counts." Hayes, 946 F.2d 
at 232. While we recognized that a promise to make no 
recommendation "is a lesser commitment [than a promise 
to take no position at all] and permits some latitude in the 
prosecutor to influence the sentence without actually 
commenting on the sentence itself," we concluded that the 
specific comments here clearly clashed with the plain 
language of the agreement, and we held for the defendant. 
Id. at 234-35. 
 
We believe that the same principles apply here. Once the 
district court had determined that the lower end of the 
applicable sentencing guideline range was higher than the 
high end of Nolan-Cooper's stipulated range, the 
government essentially had received more than it had 
bargained for when it entered into the plea agreement. 
Since the government was prohibited by the agreement 
from recommending a sentence longer than 51 months, 
once the district court determined that the low end of the 
applicable range was 68 months, the government should 
have said nothing further. As in Canada, the government's 
subsequent comments can only be interpreted as an 
attempt to influence the court to impose a longer sentence 
than stipulated to in the agreement, and is therefore a 
breach. 
 
To illustrate the limits of our holding, we identify a 
possible exception to this rule. If the government otherwise 
adheres to the terms of the plea agreement, and the court 
independently determines that the applicable range is 
higher than that stipulated to, it would not appear to be a 
breach if the government states only that in light of the 
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changed circumstances, the court should impose the lowest 
end of the applicable range. But that was not the case here. 
There is no way that the government's comments could 
possibly be construed as advocating for the lower half of the 
range, let alone the lowest possible term of imprisonment. 
To the contrary, the government's professed "shock" at 
Nolan-Cooper's "callous and calculating attempts to subvert 
the law" can only be reasonably read as advocating a severe 
sentence. 
 
We emphasize that our conclusion is not based on a 
belief that the government acted in any bad faith, but 
rather on an objective interpretation of the import of the 
government's remarks within the context of the district 
court's previous determination regarding the applicable 
guideline range. In these circumstances, the most prudent 
course would be for the government, if given an opportunity 
to comment, to inform the court that it is bound by the plea 
agreement and therefore will not make any further 
remarks. Of course, if the plea agreement permits the 
government to correct any misstatement of facts made by 
the defendant during her colloquy, the government would 
be within its power to do so -- so long as any statement it 
makes does not undermine its agreed-upon position. See 
Canada, 960 F.2d at 270. The government should exercise 
its power to comment in these circumstances with extreme 
discretion, e.g. to correct blatant misstatements by the 
defendant. Of course, if sentencing issues other than the 
amount of incarceration to be imposed are still 
undetermined, the government would be permitted to make 
any statements relevant to those issues, so long as those 
statements do not otherwise undermine other provisions of 
the plea agreement. 
 
Nolan-Cooper's second argument (i.e. that the 
government's initial misstatement of its sentencing 
recommendation also constitutes a breach) presents a 
number of difficult questions. While we are convinced that 
the government's initial misstatement was just that -- a 
misstatement -- it is similarly true that, under our case 
law, even inadvertent breaches can require vacatur of the 
sentence. See Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233. While we have 
stressed that the government must choose its words at a 
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plea hearing very carefully, we also recognize that the 
dynamics of an extemporaneous courtroom colloquy can 
lead to missteps, and we are reluctant to adopt a strict rule 
that would characterize an immediately corrected good-faith 
misstatement as a breach. But see United States v. 
Kurkculer, 918 F.2d 295 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding breach of 
plea agreement when government recommended sentence 
in violation of agreement although government withdrew its 
recommendation and then recommended agreed-upon 
sentence after continuance). It is uncertain whether our 
reluctance is precluded by our holding in Hayes that even 
inadvertent breaches having no effect on the court still 
require vacatur of the sentence. See Hayes, 946 F.2d at 
233. However, since we find that the government's 
commentary preceding its misstated recommendation itself 
constitutes a breach, we need not reach this issue. 
 
C. Remedy 
 
When the government breaches a plea agreement, the 
general rule is to remand the case to the district court for 
a determination whether to grant specific performance or to 
allow withdrawal of the plea. See Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 
941 (citing Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1363). Nolan-Cooper 
has represented in her brief and at oral argument that she 
does not wish to withdraw her plea, and we do not believe 
that the district court should be able to impose such a 
remedy on the defendant over her objections on remand. As 
the First Circuit stated in Kurkculer: 
 
       Specific performance is feasible and is a lesser burden 
       on the government and defendant. Further, permitting 
       a judge to vacate a plea over defendant's objection on 
       breach by the prosecution allows the government to 
       back out of its agreement at will and obtain a trial. 
       Given nothing more than the prosecutor's breach, the 
       circumstances do not "require" a new trial. 
 
918 F.2d at 302. 
 
It is also the rule in this circuit that if specific 
performance is the applicable remedy, the defendant must 
be resentenced by a different district judge than the one 
who presided over the now-vacated original sentence. See 
Hayes, 946 F.2d at 236. This result obtains irrespective of 
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the fact that the need for resentencing was caused by the 
government and is not attributable to any error by the 
sentencing judge. See id. (citing United States v. Corsentino, 
685 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1982)). The only remaining 
question is whether the case should be remanded for a full 
resentencing, or whether the remand should be limited to 
the provisions affected by the government's breach. The 
parties agreed that if we found a breach of the plea bargain, 
the case should be remanded for a full resentencing, and 
we believe that this is the correct result. Thus, we will 
vacate the sentence imposed and remand the case to the 
district court for resentencing before a different judge, 
pursuant to the plea agreement. 
 
IV. Downward Departure Based on 
Government Misconduct 
 
Nolan-Cooper argued to the district court at sentencing 
that a downward departure was warranted in this case 
because the government's misconduct (i.e. Agent Oubre's 
cultivation and consummation of a sexual relationship) 
during the investigation was sufficiently unusual to take 
this case outside the "heartland" of the applicable 
guidelines. The district court rejected this argument and 
denied her motion for a departure, stating: 
 
       The Court has already concluded that Ms. Nolan- 
       Cooper was not induced to commit or enlarge the crime 
       as a result of Agent Oubre's engaging in sexual 
       relations with her. In fact, all counts against Ms. 
       Nolan-Cooper that stemmed from actions taken by her 
       after the incident are to be dismissed by the 
       government at sentencing, pursuant to the plea 
       agreement. To base a downward departure on the 
       defendant's reasoning would result in a sentencing 
       windfall to the defendant for no logical or policy 
       rationale. 
 
       Therefore, the Court concludes that Ms. Nolan-Cooper 
       should be sentenced in accordance with the crime to 
       which she has pled guilty. None of the purposes of the 
       current sentencing scheme would be served by this 
       departure. Absent a due process violation or a showing 
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       that the government misconduct enlarged the scope or 
       scale of a crime, and resulted in an increased sentence, 
       a departure is not warranted. 
 
Att. at 80. According to Nolan-Cooper, this denial was 
premised on the court's conclusion that the government's 
misconduct provided a legally insufficient basis for a 
downward departure. The government contends that the 
court did not rule on legal grounds, but instead properly 
considered Nolan-Cooper's departure argument, and, based 
on the facts, ruled in its discretion that a departure was 
not warranted. 
 
The first paragraph of the district court's statement, 
rescribed above, lends credence to the government's 
argument that the court made a discretionary decision 
based on facts found after extensive hearings, while the 
second paragraph strongly supports Nolan-Cooper's 
position. We lack jurisdiction to review a district court's 
refusal to depart downward when, aware that it has the 
authority to depart, it nonetheless determines that a 
departure is not warranted, see United States v. Sally, 116 
F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. 
McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 729 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied 
117 S. Ct. 2413 (1997)), and thus if the government is 
correct we would have no jurisdiction to consider Nolan- 
Cooper's departure arguments on appeal. It appears to us, 
however, more plausible that the district court believed that 
it was legally precluded from departing in the present 
circumstances. 
 
Since we have concluded that the government's violation 
of the plea agreement requires vacatur of Nolan-Cooper's 
entire sentence and a remand for resentencing before a 
different judge of the district court, we need not definitively 
decide this issue. However, if the court did hold-- and it 
appears that it did -- that it was precluded from departing, 
we believe that such a holding would be in error. Since we 
presume that Nolan-Cooper will move for a departure on 
the same grounds at her resentencing, we think it 
appropriate for us to discuss the merits of Nolan-Cooper's 
departure claim for the guidance of the district court on 
remand. 
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The question on the merits can be easily restated. The 
district court held that a departure would not be warranted 
absent "a due process violation or a showing that the 
government misconduct enlarged the scope or scale of the 
crime." In effect, we understand the latter clause to mean 
that a departure would not be warranted unless the 
government's misconduct was related to the guilt of the 
defendant. This formulation presents the legal question 
whether potential departures based on improper 
investigative techniques that are unrelated (or only 
tangentially related) to the defendant's guilt should be 
categorically excluded under the applicable Supreme Court 
standards. 
 
The now-familiar framework for analyzing the legal 
propriety of downward departure decisions was established 
by the Supreme Court in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 
(1996). In Koon, the Court identified the three basic 
categories of departure factors set forth in the Guidelines: 
those that are encouraged, those that are discouraged, and 
those that are forbidden. See id. at 95-96. If a particular 
factor is not mentioned in the Guidelines, however, that 
does not mean that a departure based on that factor is 
precluded. To the contrary, Koon states that "a federal 
court's examination of whether a factor can ever be an 
appropriate basis for departure is limited to determining 
whether the Commission has proscribed, as a categorical 
matter, consideration of the factor." 518 U.S. at 109. 
 
As the Second Circuit has held, absent express 
prohibition by the Commission, a sentencing court"is free 
to consider, in an unusual case, whether or not the factors 
that make it unusual . . . are present in sufficient kind or 
degree to warrant a departure." United States v. Core, 125 
F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Rivera, 
994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. 
Reyes v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 735 (1998). 
This would appear to prohibit courts from categorically 
excluding any departure factor not expressly prohibited by 
the Guidelines. See United States v. Mendoza, 121 F.3d 
510, 513 (9th Cir. 1997) ("We are not at liberty, after Koon, 
to create additional categories of factors that we deem 
inappropriate as grounds for departure in every 
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circumstance."); Core, 125 F.3d at 76-77; United States v. 
Brock, 108 F.3d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1997).  
 
The factors categorically excluded by the Guidelines are 
few. They include: race, sex, national origin, creed, religion 
and socio-economic status, see U.S.S.G.S 5H1.10; lack of 
guidance as a youth, see S 5H1.12; drug or alcohol 
dependency, see S 5H1.4; and economic hardship, see 
S 5K2.12. Notably, this list does not include government 
investigatory misconduct. Thus, applying the Koon-based 
analysis employed by the Mendoza and Core courts, we 
would reach the conclusion that departures based on 
investigative misconduct unrelated (or only tangentially 
related) to the guilt of the defendant are not expressly 
precluded from consideration for departure by the 
Guidelines, and should not be categorically proscribed.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We recognize that our decision in United States v. Haut, 107 F.3d 
213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 130 (1997), arguably militates 
against this Koon-driven result. In Haut, we held that the district court 
erred in departing downward based on its belief that the government's 
witnesses were of dubious credibility and therefore that the jury's 
verdict 
was therefore equally dubious. See 107 F.3d at 219. But the departure 
in that case ran contrary to a basic tenet of our jury system that the 
district court cannot substitute its judgment of the facts and credibility 
of the witnesses for that of the jury. See id. at 220. For that reason, 
the 
Haut panel viewed such a departure factor as "categorically 
inappropriate" and stated that: 
 
       We are mindful that Koon explains that "with few exceptions, 
       departure factors should not be ruled out on a categorical basis." 
       Nonetheless, the instant case involves one of those few exceptions. 
 
Id. at 219-20 (citations omitted). This passage appears to suggest that, 
consistent with Koon, courts can still categorically exclude departure 
factors. 
 
Not surprisingly, this statement, made shortly after Koon, has caused 
some difficulty and confusion, see, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 973 F. 
Supp. 488, 493 n.4 (D.N.J. 1997), aff'd, ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. May 21, 
1998), and has not been cited elsewhere, apparently because the plain 
language of Koon, see 518 U.S. at 109, holds that the courts are not 
permitted to categorically exclude departure factors not specifically 
excluded by the Guidelines themselves. Because the precise departure 
factor in Haut was so fundamentally at odds with a foundational 
principle of our jury trial system -- the allocation of competency 
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Therefore, the district court's apparent holding that it was 
precluded from departing here would be in error.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
determinations -- Haut must be seen as a unique decision where a basic 
principle of our legal system rendered that departure factor to be an 
abuse of discretion under any circumstances. Such a bedrock principle 
is not at issue in the overwhelming majority of departure cases, and is 
not at issue here. In that regard, we read Haut as limited to its facts, 
and therefore not abrogating Koon's mandate that we are not permitted 
to look beyond the Guidelines to determine whether a categorical 
exclusion is appropriate here. 
 
We note that in a recent D.C. Circuit case, Judge Silberman, writing 
in dissent, suggests that certain factors may be categorically excluded 
from the consideration of sentencing courts despite Koon because those 
factors are precluded by more fundamental principles of law. See United 
States v. Rhodes, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 321541, *10 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(Silberman, J., dissenting). In Rhodes, Judge Silberman argued that a 
district court may not consider a prisoner's post-conviction conduct 
when it resentences that prisoner following an appeal because the very 
passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 itself implicitly precluded 
such consideration. Id. We observe that it is possible to read Haut as 
having been decided on a similar basis. 
 
13. We note that this result is consistent with our pre-Koon precedents, 
most notably United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992), 
and United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793 (3d Cir. 1994). In Lieberman, 
we considered whether the Guidelines preclude a departure when the 
government's manipulation of the indictment, though not done in bad 
faith, would result in a particular defendant being sentenced 
disproportionately to other similarly situated defendants. Lieberman, 971 
F.2d at 996-98. In that case, the government manipulated the 
indictment in such a fashion as to make impossible the grouping of the 
defendant's two related offenses under the Guidelines. We held that the 
district court was permitted to downwardly depart in such 
circumstances. Id. at 998. 
 
In Monaco, the defendant, the president of a company which had been 
awarded a Department of Defense contract, pleaded guilty to conspiracy 
in connection with a fraudulent billing scheme. To accomplish this 
scheme, the defendant had directed his son (who worked for the 
company) to prepare false labor sheets. As a consequence, the 
defendant's son was also indicted, and ultimately pleaded guilty to aiding 
and abetting a false statement. At sentencing, the district court departed 
downward, based in part upon the mental anguish the defendant felt at 
seeing his son, an otherwise law-abiding citizen, convicted of a crime 
because of his father's felonious scheme. Id. at 799-80. 
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For a departure based on a factor unmentioned in the 
Guidelines (such as improper investigatory techniques) to 
be permitted, however, it must comply with U.S.S.G. 
S 5K2.0. Under that section, a sentencing court may 
"impose a sentence outside the range established by the 
applicable guideline, if the court finds `that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that 
should result in a sentence different from that described.' " 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 (policy statement). Koon instructs that, in 
order to determine whether a departure shall be permitted 
under S 5K2.0, courts must, "after considering the 
structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines 
and the Guidelines taken as a whole, . . . decide whether it 
[the departure factor] is sufficient to take the case out of 
the Guidelines' heartland." 518 U.S. at 96 (citations 
omitted). Moreover, Koon states that, in conducting this 
"heartland" analysis, we must "bear in mind the 
Commission's expectation that departures based on 
grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be`highly 
infrequent.' " Id. Nolan-Cooper contends that various 
aspects of the misconduct by the government agents 
detailed above take this case out of the heartland. 
Primarily, she contends that Agent Oubre's manipulation of 
her romantic and sexual life constitutes an unprecedented 
invasion well-beyond the manipulation and trickery that 
the typical subject of a sting operation must endure. If 
Nolan-Cooper renews her motion for a downward departure 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Although not considered by the Sentencing Commission, we did not 
believe that the Guidelines foreclosed the possibility of a downward 
departure under these circumstances. Id. at 801. The government 
argued, however, that since the defendant's guilt was not in any way 
diminished by involving his son in the scheme, any anguish he felt 
would not be mitigating and therefore should not be permitted to ground 
a departure. Id. at 802. We rejected this argument, citing Lieberman in 
support of the proposition that "reduced moral culpability is not the only 
permissible basis for a downward departure." Id. Accordingly, we 
concluded that "certain factors unrelated to guilt may be relevant for 
departure purposes in extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 803. 
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on this basis on remand, the district court will have to 
decide whether the misconduct found here is sufficient to 
take this case outside the Guidelines' heartland.14 
 
       V. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
district court rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss the 
indictment for outrageous government misconduct. We will, 
however, vacate the defendant's sentence and remand for a 
new sentencing consistent with this opinion before a 
different judge of the district court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Nolan-Cooper also moved for a downward departure based on the 
contention that the government controlled the amount of money 
laundered during the course of Agent Oubre's investigation, and was 
thus able to inflate the severity of the sentence that she received under 
the Guidelines. Nolan-Cooper presented the district court with two 
related claims on this ground: (1) that the government's conduct was 
improper (and deserving of a departure) under the "sentencing factor 
manipulation" doctrine; and (2) that the government's determination of 
the amount of funds laundered took this case outside of the money 
laundering offense guidelines. The district court denied the motion for a 
downward departure, finding that: 
 
       [T]here is no evidence that the undercover agent pressured Ms. 
       Nolan-Cooper to engage in the money laundering, or influenced her 
       to launder more money than she was ordinarily willing to launder. 
       . . . The Court concludes that this thirteen month investigation 
       which involved the laundering of nearly $200,000 was neither 
       extended nor expanded for improper purposes and, therefore, the 
       government did not engage in conduct even approaching the 
       "extraordinary misconduct" required to show sentence factor 
       manipulation. 
 
Att. at 84. Nolan-Cooper does not now contend that the court 
erroneously rejected her "sentencing factor manipulation" claim. Rather, 
she asserts that the court failed to consider the"heartland" claim, 
violating what she terms the court's duty to consider the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, necessitating a remand for that reason. We 
find no merit to this argument. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I concur in the foregoing opinion, and yet am troubled by 
the nature of the government's conduct in this case, which 
might easily be said to involve conduct which "falls below 
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the 
proper use of governmental power." Sherman v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). Particularly troublesome is the nature and 
extent of expenditures for wining and dining Nolan-Cooper 
to "cement" the money-laundering relationship. The agents 
entertained her with suites at the Four Seasons and 
dinners at lavish restaurants, followed by club-hopping 
until the wee hours. In total, the expenses incurred in 
connection with the undercover investigation exceeded 
$50,000 (App. at 1146.) If this is standard operating 
procedure for government stings, it is little wonder that our 
citizens often question how their government spends 
taxpayers' dollars. I am less troubled as to the results in 
this case, however, because the inquiries set forth in United 
States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1991), that 
we have adopted provide the essential test for determining 
whether the government's conduct gives rise to a due 
process violation that bars prosecution. In United States v. 
Twigg, the defendant posed the same question as we 
address here, namely, was "the nature and extent of police 
involvement in this crime . . . so overreaching as to bar 
prosecution of the defendants as a matter of due process of 
law." 588 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1978). Employing the 
Cuervelo test as the means of determining the answer to 
this question in this unique type of case, we must respond 
in the negative. I view the totality of the government's 
conduct as having been reprehensible, but, as it takes two 
to tango, Nolan-Cooper's conduct was not the result of 
overreaching or overinvolvement by the government. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                43 
